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**Acts of sovereign violence due to the normalization of the state of emergency have made hegemony impossible forever for the United States—any exercise of US force in the future is only domination without hegemony that is doomed to fail**

**Gulli 13** Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” <http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence>, pg. 5

I think that we have now an understanding of what the situation is: **The sovereign everywhere**, be it the political or financial elite, **fakes the legitimacy** on which its power and authority supposedly rest. In truth, they **rest on violence and terror**, or the threat thereof. This is an **obvious and essential aspect** of the singularity of the present crisis. In this sense, the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by **the lack of hegemony**. This is true in general, but it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, **the United States**, whose hegemony has **diminished or vanished**. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard. Lacking hegemony, the **sheer drive for domination** has to show **its true face**, its **raw violence**. The usual, traditional **ideological justifications for dominance** (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become **very weak** because of **the contempt** that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) **regularly show** toward legality, morality, and humanity. Of course, the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the **I**nternational **C**riminal **C**ourt, remains a clear limit, a possibility. **Not so for the dominant nations**: who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza Strip, or envious France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their **structural, ontological and historical, weakness**. All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) **only heighten the brutality** in the exertion of **what remains of their dominance**. Although they rely on a **highly sophisticated military machine** (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has **traditionally** been and **increasingly** is an outpost for **military operations and global policing** (now excellently **incarnated by Africom**), **they know that they have lost their hegemony**.

‘**Domination without hegemony’** is a phrase that Giovanni Arrighi uses in his study of the long twentieth century and his lineages of the twenty-first century (1994/2010 and 2007). Originating with Ranajit Guha (1992), the phrase captures the singularity of the global crisis, the terminal stage of sovereignty, in Arrighi’s “historical investigation of the present and of the future” (1994/2010: 221). It acquires particular meaning in the light of Arrighi’s notion of **the bifurcation of financial and military power.** Without getting into the question, treated by Arrighi, of the rise of China and East Asia, what I want to note is that for Arrighi, early in the twenty-first century, and certainly with the ill-advised and catastrophic war against Iraq, “the US belle époque came to an end and US world hegemony entered **what in all likelihood is its terminal crisis.”** He continues:

Although the United States remains by far the world’s most powerful state, its relationship to the rest of the world is now best described as one of **‘domination without hegemony’** (1994/2010: 384). What can the US do next? **Not much, short of brutal dominance**. In the last few years, we have seen president Obama praising himself for the killing of Osama bin Laden. While that action was most likely unlawful, too (Noam Chomsky has often noted that bin Laden was a suspect, not someone charged with or found guilty of a crime), it is certain that you can kill **all the bin Ladens of the world without gaining back a bit of hegemony**. In fact, this killing, just like G. W. Bush’s war against Iraq, makes one think of a **Mafia-style** regolamento di conti more than any other thing. Barack Obama is less forthcoming about the killing of 16-year-old Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, whose fate many have **correctly compared** to **that of** 17-year-old Trayvon Martin (killed in Florida by a self-appointed security watchman), but it is precisely in cases like this one that **the weakness at the heart of empire**, the ill-concealed and uncontrolled **fury for the loss of hegemony**, becomes visible. The frenzy denies the possibility of **power as care**, which is **what should replace hegemony**, let alone domination. Nor am I sure I share Arrighi’s optimistic view about the possible rise of a new hegemonic center of power in East Asia and China: probably that would only be a shift in the axis of uncaring power, unable to affect, let alone exit, the paradigm of sovereignty and violence. What is needed is rather **a radical alternative** in which power as domination, with or without hegemony, is replaced by power as care – in other words, **a poetic rather than military and financial shift.**

**American hegemony is dead—the only thing that remains is a racist sovereign violence that makes all their impacts and the destruction of American polity only a matter of inevitability**

**Gulli 13.** Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” <http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence>, pg. 14

It is then important to ask the question of what power can alter this racism that, as Foucault says, “first develops with colonization, or in other words, with colonizing genocide” (1997: 257). From its first development, we then get to a situation where, as I noted at the outset of this paper, racist violence becomes a **global and biopolitical regime of terror**, a war between two main classes: the war of the political and financial elites against the class of those who have been dispossessed to various degrees – once again, the violence of the 1% against the 99%. As Foucault says, this is a question of the technique of power, more than of ideologies (as it was the case with the traditional type of racism), because the sovereign elites, the State, are well aware of the urgency of the struggle, the fact that, again, what is left to them is **the raw use of the violence** that, as Walter Benjamin (1978) says, informs the law, domination without hegemony. Especially at the present stage of the world, where information and knowledge make it unnecessary and thus impossible for the General Intellect or common understanding and reason to be governed, brutal domination and potentially genocidal methods of repression seem to be **the only instruments left to a decaying and ruthless global ruling class**. Then, “the old sovereign power of life and death implies the workings, the introduction and activation, of racism” (Foucault 1997: 258). Foucault makes the example of Nazi Germany, where “murderous power and sovereign power [were] unleashed throughout the entire social body” (p.259) and “**the entire population was exposed to death**” (p.260). But **this is today a common and global paradigm**: The “sovereign right to kill” (ibid.), from cases of police brutality in the cities to war atrocities throughout the world, has become **the most effective way** to deal with a ‘population’ that **refuses to recognize the false legitimacy of the sovereign, the sovereign right to govern.** What Foucault says of the Nazi State –but he acknowledges it applies to “the workings of all States” (ibid.)—shows **the terminal stage of sovereign power**: a desperate will to absolute domination **no longer able to count on hegemony**: “We have an **absolutely racist State**, **an absolutely murderous State**, and **an absolutely suicidal State**” (ibid.). This certainly shows the crisis of sovereignty as State power, but more broadly, in a globalized world, it shows the crisis of the sovereign elites, who are facing **a final solution**. No one can blame them. Their unintelligent worldview is bound to that. **The hope is that they will not destroy everything before they are gone**. Yet, they will not go by themselves, without the workings of an altering power, bound to inherit the earth. This is the power of individuation, the dignity of individuation, whose workings are based on disobedience and care. It is the power of those who, in the age of biopolitical terror, have “nothing to sell except their own skins,” (Marx 1977: 295), reversing the history of racist violence, of “conquest, enslavement, robbery, [and] murder” (ibid.).

**The impact is the sovereign’s ability to exploit fundamental flaws in the legal system and continue the global biopolitical war—the ballot should side with the global countermovement against such violence**

**Gulli 13.** Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” <http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence>, pg. 1

We live in an unprecedented time of crisis. The violence that characterized the twentieth century, and virtually all known human history before that, seems to have entered the twenty-first century with exceptional force and singularity. True, this century opened with the terrible events of September 11. However, September 11 is not the beginning of history. Nor are the histories of more forgotten places and people, the events that shape those histories, less terrible and violent – though they may often be less spectacular. The singularity of this violence, this paradigm of terror, does not even simply lie in its globality, for that is something that our century shares with the whole history of capitalism and empire, of which it is a part. Rather, it must be seen in the fact that **terror as a global phenomenon** has now become **self-conscious**. Today, the struggle is for global dominance in a singularly new way, and war –regardless of where it happens—is also **always global.** Moreover, in its self-awareness, terror has become, more than it has ever been, an instrument of racism. Indeed, what is new in the singularity of this violent struggle, this racist and terrifying war, is that in the usual attempt to neutralize the enemy, **there is a cleansing of immense proportion going on**. To use a word which has become popular since Michel Foucault, it is a biopolitical cleansing. This is not the traditional ethnic cleansing, where one ethnic group is targeted by a state power – though that is also part of the general paradigm of racism and violence. It is rather **a global cleansing**, where the sovereign elites, the global sovereigns in the political and financial arenas (capital and the political institutions), in all kinds of ways target those who do not belong with them on account of their race, class, gender, and so on, but above all, **on account of their way of life and way of thinking**. These are the multitudes of people who, for one reason or the other, are **liable for scrutiny and surveillance, extortion** (typically, in the form of over- taxation and fines) and **arrest, brutality, torture, and violent death**. The sovereigns target anyone who, as Giorgio Agamben (1998) shows with the figure of homo sacer, **can be killed without being sacrificed** – anyone who can be reduced to the paradoxical and ultimately impossible condition of bare life, whose only horizon is death itself. In this sense, the biopolitical cleansing is also immediately a thanatopolitical instrument.

The biopolitical struggle for dominance is a fight to the death. Those who wage the struggle to begin with, those who want to dominate, will not rest until they have prevailed. Their fanatical and self-serving drive is also very much **the source of the crisis** investing all others. The point of this essay is to show that the present crisis, which is systemic and permanent and thus something more than a mere crisis, **cannot be solved** unless **the struggle for dominance is eliminated**. The elimination of such struggle implies the demise of the global sovereigns, the global elites – and this will not happen without a global revolution, **a “restructuring of the world”** (Fanon 1967: 82). This must be a revolution **against the paradigm of violence** and terror typical of the global sovereigns. It is not a movement that uses violence and terror, but rather one that counters the primordial terror and violence of the sovereign elites by **living up to the vision of a new world** already worked out and cherished by multitudes of people. This is the nature of **counter-violence**: not to use violence in one’s own turn, but **to deactivate and destroy its mechanism**. At the beginning of the modern era, Niccolò Machiavelli saw the main distinction is society in terms of dominance, the will to dominate, or the lack thereof. **Freedom**, Machiavelli says, is obviously on the side of those who reject the paradigm of domination:

[A]nd doubtless, if we consider the objects of the nobles and of the people, we must see that the first have a great desire to dominate, whilst the latter have only the wish not to be dominated, and consequently a greater desire to live in the enjoyment of liberty (Discourses, I, V).

Who can resist applying this amazing insight to the many situations of resistance and revolt that have been happening in the world for the last two years? From Tahrir Square to Bahrain, from Syntagma Square and Plaza Mayor to the streets of New York and Oakland, ‘**the people’ speak with one voice against ‘the nobles**;’ the 99% all face the same enemy: the same 1%; courage and freedom face the same police and military machine of cowardice and deceit, brutality and repression. Those who do not want to be dominated, and do not need to be governed, are **ontologically on the terrain of freedom**, always-already turned toward a poetic desire for the **common good**, the **ethics of a just world**. The point here is not to distinguish between good and evil, but rather to understand the twofold nature of power – as domination or as care.

The biopolitical (and thanatopolitical) struggle for dominance is unilateral, for there is only one side that wants to dominate. The other side –ontologically, if not circumstantially, free and certainly wiser—does not want to dominate; rather, it wants not to be dominated. This means that **it rejects domination as such**. The rejection of domination also implies the rejection of violence, and I have already spoken above of the meaning of counter-violence in this sense. To put it another way, with Melville’s (2012) Bartleby, this other side **“would prefer not to”** be dominated, and it “would prefer not to” be forced into the paradigm of violence. Yet, for this preference, this desire, to pass from potentiality into actuality, **action must be taken** – an action which is a return and **a going under, an uprising and a hurricane**. Revolution is to turn oneself away from the terror and violence of the sovereign elites toward the horizon of freedom and care, which is the pre- existing ontological ground of the difference mentioned by Machiavelli between the nobles and the people, the 1% (to use a terminology different from Machiavelli’s) and the 99%. What is important is that the sovereign elite and its war machine, its police apparatuses, its false sense of the law, **be done with**. It is important that the sovereigns be shown, as Agamben says, in **“their original proximity to the criminal”** (2000: 107) **and that they be dealt with accordingly**. For this to happen, a true sense of the law must be recuperated, one whereby **the law is also immediately ethics**. The sovereigns will be **brought to justice**. The process is long, but it is in many ways already underway. The recent news that a human rights lawyer will lead a UN investigation into the question of drone strikes and other forms of targeted killing (The New York Times, January 24, 2013) is an **indication of the fact that the movement of those who do not want to be dominated is not without effect**. An initiative such as this is perhaps necessarily timid at the outset and it may be sidetracked in many ways by powerful interests in its course. Yet, **even positing**, at that institutional level, **the possibility** that drone strikes be a form of unlawful killing and war crime is a clear indication of what common reason (one is tempted to say, the General Intellect) already understands and knows. The hope of those who **“would prefer not to”** be involved in a violent practice such as this, is that those responsible for it be held accountable and that the horizon of terror be canceled and overcome. Indeed, **the earth needs care**. And when instead of caring for it, resources are dangerously wasted and abused, **it is imperative** that those **who know and understand revolt** –and what they must revolt against is the squandering and irresponsible elites, the sovereign discourse, whose authority, beyond all nice rhetoric, ultimately rests on the threat of military violence and police brutality.

**The alternative is to base demands for care and rights on the concept of dignity – an individualizing and anti-universal approach to life – anything less makes resort to violent sovereign action inevitable**

**Gulli 13.** Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” <http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence>, pg. 8

Power as care **must be based on dignity**. But what is dignity? This word must be explained because it is all too easily used, and as such it might be too vague. Precisely, **dignity is the opposite of racism**. I use the word racism in a very broad sense, understanding by it not simply the discrimination that takes place on account of a narrow category of race (i.e., of whatever is construed as race), but rather all discrimination that **happens on account of difference** when it is falsely understood that there is something – **the norm, the same**—which by definition is not different. The notion of difference then immediately acquires a negative connotation. Dignity is the reversal, a counter-movement to that. It is **the motor of counter-violence**. I think it is important to assign dignity an individuating power, and it is in this sense that I prefer to speak of **dignity of individuation** (Gulli 2010). This expression names difference as difference, outside of the decision of the same which turns it into a problematic difference rather than the one that it is. What does this mean concretely? A relevant example comes from Frantz Fanon who says:

In other words, the black man should no longer be confronted by the dilemma, **turn white or disappear**; but he should be able to **take cognizance of a possibility of existence** (1967: 100; emphasis in the original).

This is indeed a perfect example of what I mean by dignity of individuation, and it is in the phrase “a possibility of existence” that the notion of power as care is also understood. For what kind of existence is possible for the problematic difference, determined as difference by the gaze and discourse of the same? The answer is: No existence whatsoever, but rather a tormenting insistence in the false activity (thus truly a kind of passivity) of trying to ‘keep one’s place’ – something that Fanon does not advise. It is clear that dignity means to stand out. Standing out, and continuing to stand, enduring in it, **requires power as well as care**. **It does not require guns and batons, missiles and drones**. These are the tools of the weak and cowardly, of those who only equivocally belong, not simply in the human race, but **in the truth of the fact of life, its fragility**. Thus, the standing out of difference, its individuating dignity, is the unsovereign awareness of “a **possibility of existence**” – unsovereign because enmeshed in **the impersonal fragility** (yet in the potency) **of life itself**.

**Competitiveness**

**Data disproves hegemony impacts**

**Fettweis, 11**

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

**Decline is smooth**

**Preble 12** (Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in history from Temple University, former professor of history at St Cloud University and Temple University, 6-28-12, “The Critique of Pure Kagan,” http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061) GZ

The world is both more complicated and more durable than Kagan imagines. The United States does not need to police the globe in order to maintain a level of security that prior generations would envy. Neither does the survival of liberal democracy, market capitalism and basic human rights hinge on U.S. power, contrary to Kagan’s assertions. Americans need not shelter wealthy, stable allies against threats they are capable of handling on their own. Americans should not fear power in the hands of others, particularly those countries and peoples that share common interests and values. Finally, precisely because the United States is so secure, it is difficult to sustain public support for global engagement without resorting to fearmongering and threat inflation. Indeed, when Americans are presented with an accurate assessment of the nation’s power relative to others and shown how U.S. foreign policy has contributed to a vast and growing disparity between what we spend and what others spend on national security—the very state of affairs that Kagan celebrates—they grow even less supportive.

**Hegemonic stability theory is nonsensical**

**Mack 10** (Andrew Mack, literally the person that they cite in their card, the guy who doesn’t like heg, “The Causes of Peace”) gz

As with other realist claims, there are reasons for **skepticism**¶ about the peace through preponderance thesis. First, if it were¶ true, we might expect that the most powerful states would¶ experience the least warfare. However, since the end of World¶ War II, **the opposite** has in fact been the case. Between 1946¶ and 2008, the four countries that had been involved in the¶ greatest number of international conflicts were France, the¶ UK, the US, and Russia/USSR.19 Yet, these were four of the¶ most powerful conventional military powers in the world—¶ and they all had nuclear weapons.¶ The fact that **major powers tend to be more involved in**¶ **international conflicts** than minor powers is not surprising.¶ Fighting international wars requires the capacity to project¶ substantial military power across national frontiers and often¶ over very long distances. Few countries have this capacity;¶ major powers have it by definition.¶ But there is a more serious challenge to the preponderance¶ thesis. From the end of World War II until the early 1970s,¶ nationalist struggles against colonial powers were the most¶ frequent form of international conflict. The **failure** of the far¶ more powerful colonial powers to prevail in these conflicts poses¶ a **serious challenge** to the core assumptions of preponderance¶ theories—and marked a remarkable historical change.¶ During most of the history of colonial expansion and rule¶ there had been little effective resistance from the inhabitants¶ of the territories that were being colonized. Indeed, as one¶ analyst of the wars of colonial conquest noted, “by and large, it¶ would seem true that what made the machinery of European¶ troops so successful was that native troops saw fit to die, with¶ glory, with honor, en masse, and in vain.”20¶ The ease of colonial conquest, the subsequent crushing¶ military defeats imposed on the Axis powers by the superior¶ military industrial might of the Allies in World War II, and the¶ previous failure of the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations,¶ to stop Fascist aggression all served to reinforce the idea that¶ preponderance—superiority in military capability—was the¶ key both to peace through deterrence and victory in war.¶ But in the post-World War II world, new strategic realities¶ raised serious questions about assumptions regarding the¶ effectiveness of conventional military superiority. In particular,¶ the outcomes of the wars of colonial liberation, the US defeat¶ in Vietnam, and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan demonstrated¶ that in some types of conflict, **military preponderance could**¶ **neither deter nationalist forces nor be used to defeat them**.¶ The outcomes of these conflicts posed a major challenge for¶ preponderance theories.¶ Not only did the vastly superior military capabilities of¶ the colonial powers **fail to deter** the nationalist rebels from¶ going to war but in every case it was **the nationalist forces**¶ **that prevailed**. The colonial powers withdrew and the colonies¶ gained independence. Military preponderance was strategically¶ **irrelevant**.¶ Writing about US strategy in Vietnam six years before the¶ end of the war, Henry Kissinger noted:¶ We fought a military war; our opponents fought a¶ political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents¶ aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the¶ process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims¶ of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not¶ lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.21¶ For the nationalist forces, military engagements were¶ never intended to defeat the external power militarily—that¶ was impossible. The strategy was rather to seek the progressive¶ attrition of the metropole’s political capability to wage war—¶ “will” in the language of classical strategy.22 In such conflicts,¶ if the **human, economic, and reputational costs** to the external¶ power increase with **little prospect of victory**, support for the¶ war in the metropole will **steadily erode** and the pressure to¶ withdraw will inexorably increase.

**Their reading of Ikenberry is a paradigm of the American tendency to paper over numerous failures of American hegemony – US imperialism has set up neo-imperial regimes which eliminated natives’ culture, freedom, and livelihood. The aff’s impacts are predicated on imperialism, colonialism, classism, and racism**

**Barder, 13**

/Alexander D., Department of Political Studies & Public Administration, American University of Beirut, Beirut, Lebanon, PhD in Political Theory from John Hopkins, “American Hegemony Comes Home: The Chilean Laboratory and the Neoliberalization of the United States” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 2013 38: 103 originally published online 22 April 2013, DOI: 10.1177/0304375413486331/

As I argued above, American liberal hegemony entered a profound crisis in the 1970s as a result of intracapitalist competition and the consequences of the American defeat in the Vietnam War. Both of these factors are missing in **Ikenberry’s** narrative of American international hegemony, which only focuses on certain aspects of what Arrighi calls America’s terminal crisis. What is missing in Ikenberry’s work is any sense of the reassertion of American hegemony beginning in the 1970s that culminated in the Reagan/Thatcher monetarist counterrevolution. In Ikenberry’s framework, as mentioned above, the New Deal era was internationalized in the aftermath of the Second World War as a way of mitigating the worst excesses of unregulated capitalism to promote social and economic welfare. Liberal hierarchy here works, as I argued above, unidirectionally from American embedded liberalism and its progressive instantiation in various international organizations and through the socialization of states into this American-led international order. What remains unexplored are the reverse impacts: how patterns of international hegemony create the conditions for domestic institutional change. What were the domestic consequences for the reassertion of American hegemony in the mid- to late 1970s for American domestic institutions? How, in other words, did the political–economic discourse go from the Nixonian ‘‘We are all Keynesians’’ to a decade later the famous Thatcherite mantra ‘‘There is no alternative’’ (TINA, i.e., There Is No Alternative to the radical implementation of monetarist policies and the contraction of the state)? Indeed, at a party conference in 1980, Thatcher explicitly calls for discipline and fortitude in the face of a grave economic/inflationary crisis. At the same time, she insists that her policies are to be considered ‘‘normal, sound, and honest.’’57 In other words, Thatcher promotes the inevitability and naturalness of her program at the same time as she stresses the urgency of its adoption. The depoliticized and inevitable necessity for the neoliberalization of the United States and the United Kingdom is part of what Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant have shown to be the the manifestation of a vulgate borne out ‘‘of a new type of imperialism’’. As they further add, [This vulgate’s] effects are all the more powerful and pernicious in that it is promoted not only by the partisans of the neoliberal revolution who, under cover of ‘modernization’, intend to remake the world by sweeping away the social and economic conquests of a century of social struggles, henceforth depicted as so many archaisms and obstacles to the emergent new order, but also by cultural producers (researchers, writers and artists) and left-wing activists, the vast majority of whom still think of themselves as progressives.58 Bourdieu and Wacquant point to how the ‘‘cultural imperialism’’ of neoliberal discourse has seeped into the very vocabulary of economic governance, making it appear entirely natural and self-evident. As they observe, ‘‘the automatic effect of the international circulation of ideas, . . . tends, by its very logic, to conceal their original conditions of production and signification, the play of preliminary definitions and scholastic deductions replaces the contingency of denegated sociological necessities with the appearance of logical necessity and tends to mask the historical roots of a whole set of questions and notions . . . .’’59 Indeed, the active concealment of the origin of these neoliberal ideas and how they came into practice, I claim, points to how much neoliberal discourse forgets its origins in the crucibles of ***Latin American*** neo-imperial experiments.60 What I wish to show is how these neoliberal ideas, as part of a larger project to reassert American hegemony, were in fact initially deployed in the experimental crucibles of South America before being legitimized and normalized for implementation in the United States.61 To see then the imbrications between the reassertion of American hegemony in the 1970s and the neoliberalization of the American domestic political economy, it is important to recall that the crisis of legitimacy provoked by America’s war of attrition in Southeast Asia coincided with the emergence of novel social movements that challenged the social mores of American society. The civil rights movement, the feminist movement, the sexual revolution, and the student rebellions against the war effort revealed latent trends of racism, sexism, and other forms of social domination at the heart of American society. These movements, as Harvey notes, ‘‘challenged the traditional structure of networked class relations.’’62 Domestic emancipatory developments during the 1960s and 1970s proved to be part of, what Arrighi describes as, the ‘‘highly depressing experience for the bourgeoisie of the West’’ because it fundamentally called into question the authority of the state and the ruling classes throughout the capitalist world.63 While the 1960s represented an enormous surge in democratic participation across the developed world, in the United States especially with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Samuel Huntington would argue in 1976, such an expansion, along with an increase in governmental expenditure of social welfare, ‘‘produced a substantial . . . . decrease in governmental authority.’’64 This happened because democratic participation, for Huntington, increased ideological polarization, which in turn undermined governmental authority when the results of governmental action did not fulfill expectations. Indeed, the significant changes in fiscal, monetary, and social policies in the late 1970s were reflective of this perceived need to reassert domestic governmental authority. The Reagan administration then worked toward directly challenging the central collective compact between labor, management, and the state that the New Deal established in order to recreate a ‘‘good business environment’’ for continuous capital accumulation. 65 As David Harvey argues, unleashing financial power proved to be a convenient way to ‘‘discipline working-class movements,’’ essentially reasserting a form of class power over a society riveted by social stratification and the loss of governmental authority.66 But how was this process legitimized in the first place? Understanding what Jaime Peck terms the neoliberalization of the state necessitates a detour through Chile during the 1970s.67 The ‘‘crudely imperial’’ policies of the United States in Latin America during the 1970s proved to be a crucial feature of the neoliberalization of the United States itself. The experimental implementation of economic orthodoxy—the deregulation of state power, financialization, or the unrestrained practice of financial and trading markets, privatization and the destruction of forms of social solidarity such as trade unions—established Chile as the first largescale neoliberal laboratory. Chile subsequently legitimized neoliberal discourse that would prove to be highly malleable in different contexts. ‘‘The Chilean case,’’ as Juan Gabriel Valde´s argues, ‘‘became a model, a unique phenomenon that did not stem from any historical experience. Rather, it originated directly from what the ***Chicago Boys*** termed ‘‘economic science’’: a science to be found mostly in their textbooks.’’68 It is the implementation and experience of neoliberal revolution that proved crucial for its normalization as a valid or ‘‘tried and true’’ theory for subsequent implementation in the United States. Under conditions of what later became known as shock treatment, Latin America during the 1970s proved to be the crucible for experimenting with the ideas put forward by the Chicago School of economic theory. In Latin America, economic regulatory mechanisms were radically and quickly transformed in favor of market-based solutions characteristic of neo-imperial reassertion.69 The Chicago School of economic theory, embodied in the writings and teachings of Milton Friedman, who won the Nobel Prize in 1976, advocated the deregulation of markets and the contraction of the state as a way of promoting individual freedom and wealth.70 Following Friedrich von Hayek, Friedman and other neoconservative proponents believed that markets in general possess an internal rationality that nullifies the potential for state domination. The ideas emanating from **the Chicago School** of economics depoliticized economic questions by emphasizing how ‘‘markets’’ were able to address substantive political problems. Neoliberalization, Wendy Brown argues following Michel Foucault, takes for granted that ‘‘The political sphere, along with every other dimension of contemporary existence, is submitted to an economic rationality . . . [and that] all dimensions of human life are cast in terms of a market rationality.’’71 Neoliberalization was then much more than simply the financialization of the international and domestic economies, as Arrighi argues, but the attempt at completely rewiring the political–economic form of American liberal hegemony. The novelty of neoliberalization, as Peck argues, ‘‘denotes the repeated (necessity for) renewal and reinvention of a project that could never be fixed as a stable formula, and which has lurched through moments of innovation, overreach, correction, and crisis.’’72 This political–economic project was first concretely experimented with in Chile during its own internal crises of the 1970s.73 What was significant in this case was that the neoliberal experiment occurred in the aftermath of the American-influenced coup d’e´tat by General Augusto Pinochet on September 11, 1973. The election of the leftist Salvador Allende in 1970 was deemed by the Nixon administration to be a grave threat to American strategic and corporate interests in the Western hemisphere. National security advisor Henry Kissinger argued at a meeting of the National Security Council [NSC] that Allende’s program ‘‘would pose some very serious threats to our interests and position in the hemisphere, and would affect developments and our relations to them elsewhere in the world.’’ Chile, Kissinger continued, could ‘‘become part of a Soviet/Socialist world, not only philosophically but in terms of power dynamics; and it might constitute a support base and entry point for expansion of Soviet and Cuban presence and activity in the region.’’74 In this Cold War geopolitical context, what Valde´s calls the ‘‘ideological transfer’’ of Chicago School economic ideas through their progenitors, the Chicago Boys, was perceived transnationally by American and Chilean elites as a way of countering the legitimacy of socialist/Marxist ideas. The Chicago Boys—Chilean graduate students at the University of Chicago, whose studies were financed in part by the Ford Foundation and the State Department, and who would later become faculty members in various economics departments in Chile—embarked on the radical transformation of the Chilean economy.75 As Mario Sznajder writes, Chile had become a kind of socio-economic laboratory in which a neoliberal experiment was being carried out with scant political hinderance. In the second half of the 1970s, the military government gave priority to the economic experiment, relying on its success to legitimise the future political framework of limited democracy, which in turn would provide the required guarantee for the survival and defence of the neoliberal model.76 This radical transformation was largely justified as a reaction against everything that Salvador Allende’s socialist economic program stood for. What was characterized as La vı´a chilena al socialismo, social spending to alleviate poverty, protection of domestic industries, a moratorium of foreign debt repayment, made the Nixon administration so fearful of its turn toward the Soviet Union.77 For the purposes of ‘‘shocking’’ the economic system in order to push for dramatic changes that the Chicago boys would otherwise have been unable to accomplish, authoritarianism and economic reform occurred hand in hand. The result was that what were ostensibly political decisions, the determination of the contours of the socioeconomic order was not determined democratically, but rather by economic experts.78 The authoritarianism of the Chilean coup was characterized by the arrest of over 13,000 people deemed ‘‘Marxist subversives’’; grave abuses of human rights occurred over a prolonged period of time, including executions of political dissents.79 Nonetheless, with the economy in a shambles in the aftermath of the coup, Chile was an ideal place for experimenting with ideas that had been gestating among the Chicago Boys and their teachers for many years. First and foremost, these economists ‘‘radically altered the Chilean economic paradigm, bringing it into line not just with military self-interest in retaining control but also with the general tendencies of the world economy.’’80 ‘‘The goal [of the Chicago Boys attempt at reform],’’ as Valde´s further adds, ‘‘was nothing less than the transformation of the state, of customs, and of culture’’ but especially, as Pinochet himself remarked, to engender a complete ‘‘change in mentality.’’81 The explicit purpose of economic transformation was to tame the hyperinflation of the preceding years, but it proved to be an opportunity to implement ‘‘a radical economic liberalization program based on the indiscriminate use of market mechanisms, the dismantling and reduction of the state, deregulation of the financial sector, and a discourse that ascribed to market forces the ability to solve practically any problem in society.’’82 As a result of the privatization of finance and the lowering of tariffs and taxation, Chile became, as one New York Times journalist characterized it, ‘‘a banker’s delight.’’ According to this journalist, the Chicago Boys economically and politically cemented Chile’s position in the US imperial orbit.83 This transformation of the Chilean economy along Chicago School theories, for the purposes of aligning it, as Valde´s argues, with the world economy captured the imagination of a whole host of academic economists, journalists, and policy makers in the United States and in various international organizations: From the mid-1970s onward, the country enjoyed privileged treatment by the IMF and the commercial banks. Chile was doubtless the country most visited and commented upon by journalists from the international conservative press, as well as by a distinguished list of academics headed by the most prominent members of the Chicago School of Economics, including Milton Friedman himself. The reason for this interest is easy to comprehend: Chile had become the first and most famous example of applying the rules of economic orthodoxy to a developing country. Foreign trade was liberalized, prices were freed, state companies were privatized, the financial sector was deregulated, and state functions were drastically reduced.84 A Barron’s editorial in 1980 quoted Arnold Harberger, a professor at the time at the University of Chicago who was perhaps even more influential than Milton Friedman with the Chicago Boys, as arguing that the Chilean reforms were ‘‘the most important reforms made in the underdeveloped world in recent history.’’ As the editorial further adds quoting an anonymous colleague of Harberger’s: ‘‘The economics textbooks say that’s the way the world should work, but where else do they practice it?’’85 Implied here is that the economic programof the Chicago Boys is suitable for implementation throughout the developing world as a way of generating economic growth and efficiency.86 But there is also a certain implication for what needs to be done within the United States itself that was at the time faced with a growing crisis of stagflation. Of course, the obvious authoritarianism of the Pinochet government and its breaches of international human rights conventions was a significant source of contention and even opprobrium; Friedman himself would be tagged as complicit in legitimizing the Pinochet regime through his own trip to Chile in 1975 and his meeting with Pinochet. His awarding of the Nobel Prize in 1976 was accompanied with protests. But as Corey Robin has recently uncovered, in 1981 American academics including Friedman, Hayek, James M. Buchanan, and Arnold Harberger, along with their counterparts from many other countries, met in Vin˜a del Mar under the auspices of the Mont Pelerin Society, to demonstrate the effectiveness of Chilean market reforms and the need to learn its lessons for the United States itself. The inherent authoritarian setting in Chile should not be seen as anything detrimental to the neoliberal project. On the contrary, as Robin cites Eric Brodin’s original commentary on the Vin˜a del Mar conference, ‘‘what is politically possible in authoritarian Chile, may not be possible in a republic with a congress filled with ‘‘gypsy moths’’ for whom political expediency often takes precedence over economic realities, especially in an election year.’’87 Again, implied here is a certain perception that a reassertion of governmental authority within the United States is necessary to address domestic and international political–economic questions. The Chilean example represented a success story for a reinvigorated conservative movement in the United States and the United Kingdom during the mid- to late 1970s. In 1981, Hayek himself would speak of Chile as ‘‘a great success’’ and predicted that ‘‘The world shall come to regard the recovery of Chile as one of the great economic miracles of our time.’’88 Chile became the decisive laboratory for the establishment, more generally, of a transnational post-Fordist economic order which emphasized flexibility, innovation, and creative destruction. This new order replaced the Bretton Woods currency framework by privileging the free flow of finance capital as a way of restructuring and disciplining various internal economies. The transformation of internal economic structures by finance capital was accompanied by a general sentiment that excessive popular democracy is detrimental to economic rights and liberties and that market rationality would best determine the distribution of wealth. The neoliberalization of Chile encapsulated the hopes and agenda of American’s conservatives to privatize a significant portion of the state to market forces, to deregulate financial services and lower taxation, and above all, to suppress the power of trade unions. However, this domestic project to promote economic freedom at home and abroad was fundamentally connected to the restoration of American hegemony. The Reagan revolution in the United States largely rested on the dual program of domestic economic neoliberalization and a pseudo-Keynesian massive armaments buildup. ‘‘The effect of what seemed to be a confused economic policy was,’’ as Grandin argues, ‘‘in retrospect, a cohesive transformation of American society and diplomacy—the institutionalizing of a perpetual system of global austerity that rendered political liberalism, both domestic and international, not viable.’’89 Arrighi argues that tight monetary policies were designed to resurrect confidence in the United States and its currency. However, austerity had significant repercussions for American domestic industry and led to a significant dismantling of trade unionism, an overarching neoconservative political goal. The great recession of the early 1980s was at the same time an engineered shock treatment that was designed to roll back inflation to the detriment of state welfare, while accentuating class power. Taxation changes primarily favored wealthy classes and financial deregulation opened up finance capital for enormous speculative bubbles over the subsequent thirty years. The effect of this program of neoliberalization conjoined with the Reagan ‘‘rollback’’ of Soviet influence depoliticized such economic ‘‘shock’’ transformations at home and abroad. The neoliberalization of the state and society in the United States and the United Kingdom represents the normalization of pervious shock treatments experimented first and foremost within the Chilean neo-imperial crucible. This normalization of radical economic theories through hegemonic international circuits such as the IMF, the World Bank, ***academics***, journalists, various semiprivate think tanks in the West, gave rise to what Bourdieu and Wacquant have termed a neoliberal vulgate that legitimizes a depoliticized program for structural reform across not only the global South but also within the North as the only viable program to tackle the twin economic problems of growth and inflation. As opposed to Ikenberry who draws a straight line from 1945 to the present without so much as noting the significance of the crisis of American hegemony in the 1970s, these years proved pivotal for a reassertion of hegemony through domestic and international (i.e., throughout the global South) neoliberalization. This reassertion could not be accomplished by military means, as demonstrated in Vietnam; it had to come through the radical transformation of **domestic socioeconomic configurations** that would privilege specific classes that would realign the South within America’s neo-imperial orbit. But what also needs to be recognized is that this global American hegemonic reassertion was intimately tied to domestic (counterrevolutionary) changes beginning in the 1980s. This conjunction between the international and the domestic is more clearly seen in how ideas, norms, and practices are experimented with in certain spaces, travel across international hierarchical circuits, and return as normalized and legitimized.

**No naval impact – deterrence fails**

**Daniel 2** [Donald C.F. “The Future of American Naval Power: Propositions and Recommendations,” Globalization and American Power. Chapter 27. Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Books/Books\_2002/Globalization\_and\_Maritime\_Power\_Dec\_02/0 1\_toc.htm]

In sum, there would seem to be a special role for the U.S. Navy in contingency response along littorals, but, **outside the context of a specific crisis, constant day-to-day presence does not do much to deter unwanted behavior**. Thus, it would seem a raising of false expectations to argue, for example, that the “gapping of aircraft carriers in areas of potential crisis is an invitation to disaster—and therefore represents culpable negligence on the part of America’s defense decision-makers.”33 In the early 1960s, the United States maintained three aircraft carrier battlegroups in the Mediterranean Sea but later gradually found that it needed to scale back. Currently, a single battlegroup operates there for less than 9 months of the year on average. This is a significant reduction, but no one can prove that the Mediterranean region became less stable. Conversely, **the Navy began to maintain a regular presence in the Arabian Gulf in 1979, but this did not prevent Iran or Iraq from attacking ships during their war**. In the 1980s, attacks generally increased in number over the 8 years of the war. **As for deterring the initiation of a crisis in the first place, it is essentially impossible for** an outsider **to prove that such deterrence was successful** except in the rare case in which a deterred party admits that he was deterred and states the reasons. Adam **Siegel**, John **Arquilla**, Paul **Huth**, Paul **Davis, and** a **Rutgers Center for Global Security and Democracy** team led by Edward Rhodes **have each attempted to study the effects of forward presence and general deterrence**. The deficiency of such study is always in making the definitive link between them. **The majority of these studies suggest that “[h]istorically seapower has not done well as a deterrent” in preventing the outbreak of conflicts, principally because land-based powers not dependent on overseas trade are relatively “insensitive” to the operations of naval forces**.

**Econ**

**No impact to the economy**

Thomas P.M. **Barnett** (senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine) August 20**09** “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis” http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: \* No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); \* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); \* Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); \* No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); \* A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and \* No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

**Royal concludes neg – the next page says decline disincentives saber rattling**

**Royal, their author, 10**—director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, published in *Economics of War and Peace*: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 217, google books)

There is, however, another trend at play. Economic crises tend to fragment regimes and divide polities. A decrease in cohesion at the political leadership level and at the electorate level **reduces the ability** of the state to coalesce a sufficiently strong political base **required to undertake costly balancing measures** such as economic costly signals. Schweller (2006) builds on earlier studies (sec, e.g., Christensen, 1996; Snyder, 2000) that link political fragmentation with decisions **not to balance** against rising threats or to balance only in minimal and ineffective ways to demonstrate a tendency for states to 'underbalance'. Where political and social cohesion is strong, states are more likely to balance against rising threats in effective and costly ways. However, 'unstable and fragmented regimes that rule over divided polities will be significantly constrained in their ability to adapt to systemic incentives; they will be least likely to enact bold and costly policies **even when their nation's survival is at stake** and they are needed most' (Schweller, 2006, p. 130).

**Economic threat predictions will cause the US to manipulate regimes in a non-democratic fashion---link turns the whole case and empirically kills millions**

**Neocleous**, Prof of Gov, **08** [Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, *Critique of Security*, p95-]

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its

economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.99 Despite the fact that ‘econ omic security’ would never be formally deﬁned beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the signiﬁcant conceptual con sistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped **co-opt the liberal Left into the process** and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and‘social equality’.101

Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102

In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole worldbecame a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of ﬁfteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of **intervention and policing all over the globe**. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capitalaccumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also‘secured’ everywhere.

Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an **ambitious and frequently violent strategy.** Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conﬂict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the **‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence**. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen ﬁt to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104

‘Extrapolating the ﬁgures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identiﬁed as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have

been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign ofﬁcials; drug-trafﬁcking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-

opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the

reasons fascism ﬂowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108

Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the ﬁve Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new‘secure’ global liberal order.

The result has been the **slaughter of untold numbers**. John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this:

Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and ﬁguring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difﬁcult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a ﬁgure of **six million people killed – and this is a minimum** ﬁgure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109

Note that the six million is a minimum ﬁgure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history. All of this has been more than conﬁrmed by events in the twentyﬁrst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the ofﬁcial National Security Strategy of the United Statesin September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it.

While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufﬁcient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver saries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110

In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security beneﬁts of ‘economic liberty’, and the beneﬁts to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111

**Their impacts rely on the concept of the homo calculan – this creates a sadistic necro-economy that makes their impacts inevitable and turns us into slaves**

**Bifo 11** – (Franco, “After the Future,” ed. Genesko & Thoburn, AKPress, p. 141-7)//Loyola

More than ever, economic rationality is at odds with social rationality. Economic science is not part of the solution to the crisis: it is the source of the problem. On July 18th 2009 the headline of The Economist read: “What went wrong with economics?” The text is an attempt to downplay the crisis of the Economics profession, and of economic knowledge. For neoliberal economists the central **dogma of growth**, profit and competition cannot be questioned, because it is identified with the perfect **mathematical rationality** of the market. And belief in the intrinsic rationality of the market is crucial in the economic theology of neoliberalism. But the reduction of social life to the rational exchange of economic values is an obsession that has nothing to do with science. It’s a political strategy aimed to identify humans as calculating machines, aimed to shape behavior and perception in such a way that money becomes the only motivation of social action. But it is not accurate as a description of social dynamics, and the conflicts, pathologies, and irrationality of human relationships. Rather, it is an attempt at creating the anthropological brand of homo calculans that Foucault (2008) has described in his seminar of 1979/80, published with the title The Birth of Biopolitics. This attempt to identify human beings with calculating devices has produced cultural devastation, and has finally been showed to have been based upon flawed assumptions. Human beings do calculate, but their **calculation is not perfectly rational**, because the value of goods is not determined by objective reasons, and because decisions are influenced by what Keynes named animal spirits. “We will never really understand important economic events unless we confront the fact that their causes are largely mental in nature,” say Akerlof and Shiller (2009: 1) in their book Animal Spirits, echoing Keynes’s assumption that the rationality of the market is not perfect in itself. Akerlof and Shiller are avowing the crisis of neoliberal thought, but their critique is of radical enough, and does not touch the legitimacy of the economic episteme. Animal Spirits is the title of an other book, by Matteo Pasquinelli (2008). Pasquinelli’s book deals with bodies and digits, and parasites, and goes much deeper in its understanding of the roots of the crisis than its eponymous publication: “Cognitive capitalism emerges in the form of a parasite: it subjects social knowledge and inhibits its emancipatory potential” (Pasquinelli 2008: 93). “Beyond the computer screen, precarious workers and freelancers experience how Free Labor and competition are increasingly **devouring their everyday life**” (Pasquinelli 2008: 15). Pasquinelli goes to the core of the problem: the virtualization of social production has acted as the proliferation of a parasite, destroying the prerequisites of living relationships, absorbing and neutralizing the living energies of cognitive workers. The economic recession is not only the effect of financial craziness, but also the effect of the de-vitalization of the social field. This is why the collapse of the economic system is also the collapse of economic epistemology that has guided the direction of politics in the last two centuries. Economics cannot understand the depth of the crisis, because below the crisis of financial exchange there is the crisis of **symbolic exchange**. I mean the psychotic boom of panic, depression, and suicide, the general decline of desire and social empathy.

The question that rises from the collapse is so radical that the answer cannot be found in the economic conceptual framework. Furthermore, one must ask if economics really is a science? If the word “science” means the creation of concepts for the understanding and description of an object, **economics is not a science**. Its object does not exist. The economic object (scarcity, salaried labor, and profit) is not an object that exists before and outside the performative action of the economic episteme. Production, consumption, and daily life become part of the economic discourse when labor is detached and opposed to human activity, when it falls under the domination of capitalist rule. The economic object does not pre-exist conceptual activity, and economic description is in fact a normative action. In this sense Economics is a technique, a process of semiotization of the world, and also a mythology, a narration. Economics is a suggestion and a categorical imperative: Money makes things happen. It is the source of action in the world and perhaps the only power we invest in. Life seems to depend on it. Everything within us would like to say that it does not, that this cannot be. But the Almighty Dollar has taken command. The more it is denied the more it shows itself as Almighty. Perhaps in every other respect, in every other value, bankruptcy has been declared, giving money the power of some sacred deity, demanding to be recognized. Economics no longer persuades money to behave. Numbers cannot make the beast lie down and be quiet or sit up and do tricks. At best, economics is a neurosis of money, a symptom contrived to hold the beast in abeyance…. Thus economics shares the language of psychopathology – inflation, depression, lows and highs, slumps and peaks, investments and losses. (Sordello 1983) From the age of the enclosures in England the economic process has been a process of **production of scarcity** (scarcification). The enclosures were intended to scarcify the land, and the basic means of survival, so that people who so far had been able to cultivate food for their family were forced to become proletarians, then salaried industrial workers. Capitalism is based on the artificial creation of need, and economic science is essentially a technique of scarcification of time, life and food. Inside the condition of scarcity human beings are subjected to exploitation and to the domain of profit-oriented activity. After scarcifying the land (enclosures) capitalism has scarcified time itself, forcing people who don’t have property other than their own life and body, to lend their life-time to capital. Now the capitalist obsession for growth is making scarce both water and air. Economic science is not the science of prediction: it is the technique of producing, implementing, and pushing scarcity and need. This is why Marx did not speak of economy, but of political economy. The technique of economic scarcification is based on a mythology, a narration that identifies richness as property and acquisition, and subjugates the possibility of living to the lending of time and to the transformation of human activity into salaried work. In recent decades, **technological change** has slowly eroded the very foundations of economic science. Shifting from the sphere of production of material objects to the semiocapitalist production of immaterial goods, the Economic concepts are losing their foundation and legitimacy. The basic categories of Economics are becoming totally artificial. The theoretical justification of private property, as you read in the writings of John Locke, is based on the need of exclusive consumption. An apple must be privatized, if you want to avoid the danger that someone else eats your apple. But what happens when goods are immaterial, infinitely replicable without cost? Thanks to digitalization and immaterialization of the production process, the economic nomos of private **property loses its ground**, its raison d’etre, and it can be **imposed only by force**. Furthermore, the very foundation of salary, the relationship between time needed for production and value of the product, is vanishing. The immaterialization and cognitivization of production makes it almost impossible to quantify the average time needed to produce value. Time and value become incommensurable, and violence becomes the only law able to determine price and salary. The neoliberal school, which has opened the way to the worldwide deregulation of social production, has fostered the mythology of rational expectations in economic exchange, and has touted the idea of a selfregulation of the market, first of all the labor-market. But self-regulation is a lie. In order to increase exploitation, and to destroy social welfare, global capitalism has used political institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, not to mention the military enforcement of the political decisions of these institutions. Far from being self-regulated, the market is militarily regulated. The mythology of free individuals loyally competing on the base of perfect knowledge of the market is a lie, too. Real human beings are not perfect rational calculating machines. And the myth of rational expectations has finally crashed after the explosion of the real estate mortgage bubble. The theory of rational expectation is crucial in neoliberal thought: the economic agents are supposed to be free to choose in a perfectly rational way the best deal in selling and buying. The fraud perpetrated by the investment agencies has destroyed the lives of millions of Americans, and has exposed the theoretical swindle. Economic exchange cannot be described as a rational game, because **irrational factors** play a crucial role in social life in general. Trickery, misleading information, and psychic manipulation are not exceptions, but the professional tools of advertisers, financial agents, and economic consultants. The idea that social relationships can be described in mathematical terms has the force of myth, but it is not science, and it has nothing to do with natural law. Notwithstanding the failure of the theory, neoliberal politics are still in control of the global machine, because the criminal class that has seized power has no intention of stepping down, and because the social brain is unable to recompose and find the way of self-organization. I read in the New York Times on September 6th 2009: After the mortgage business imploded last year, Wall Street investment banks began searching for another big idea to make money. They think they may have found one. The bankers plan to buy “life settlements,” life insurance policies that ill and elderly people sell for cash, depending on the life expectancy of the insured person. Then they plan to “securitize” these policies, in Wall Street jargon, by packaging hundreds of thousands together into bonds. They will then resell those bonds to investors, like big pension funds, who will receive the payouts when people with the insurance die. The earlier the policyholder dies, the bigger the return, though if people live longer than expected investors could get poor returns or even lose money. Imagine that I buy an insurance policy on my life (something I would absolutely not do). My insurer of course will wish me a long life, so I’ll pay the fee for a long time, while he should pay lots of money to my family if I die. But some enlightened finance guru has the brilliant idea of insuring the insurer. He buys the risk, and he invests on the hope that I die soon. You don’t need the imagination of Philip K. Dick to guess the follow up of the story: financial agents will be motivated to kill me overnight. The talk of **recovery is based on necronomy**, the economy of death. It’s not new, as capitalism has always profited from wars, slaughters and genocides. But now the equation becomes unequivocal. **Death is the promise, death is the investment and the hope.** Death is the best future that capitalism may secure. The logic of speculation is different from the logic of spectacle that was dominant in late-modern times. Spectacle is the mirrorization of life, the transfer of life in the mirror of spectacular accumulation. Speculation is the subjugation of the future to its financial mirror, the substitution of present life with future money that will never come, because death will come before. The lesson that we must learn from the first year of the global recession is sad: neoliberal folly is not going away, the financial plungers will not stop their speculation, and corporations will not stop their exploitation, and the political class, largely controlled by the corporate lobbies, is unwilling or unable to protect society from the final assault. In 1996 J. G. Ballard (1996: 188) wrote: “the most perfect crime of all – when the victims are either willing, or aren’t aware that they are victims”. Democracy seems unable to stop the criminal class that has seized control of the economy, because the **decisions are no longer made in the sphere of political opinion**, but in the inaccessible sphere of economic automatism. The economy has been declared the basic standard of decision, and the economists have systematically identified Economy with the capitalist obsession of growth. No room for political choice has been left, as the corporate principles have been embedded in the technical fabric of language and imagination.

## 2NC

### 2NC OV

We control the root cause of modern violence – the operation of inclusion/exclusion makes extermination inevitable

**Duarte, 5** – professor of Philosophy at Universidade Federal do Paraná (André, “Biopolitics and the dissemination of violence: the Arendtian critique of the present,” April 2005, http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=andre\_duarte)//bghs-BI

These historic transformations have not only brought more violence to the core of the political but have also redefined its character by giving rise to biopolitical violence. As stated, what characterizes biopolitics is a dynamic of both protecting and abandoning life through its inclusion and exclusion from the political and economic community. In Arendtian terms, the biopolitical danger is best described as the risk of converting animal laborans into Agamben’s homo sacer, the human being who can be put to death by anyone and whose killing does not imply any crime whatsoever 13).  When politics is conceived of as biopolitics, as the task of increasing the life and happiness of the national *animal laborans*, the nation-state becomes ever more violent and murderous. If we link Arendt’s thesis from *The Human Condition* to those of The Origins of Totalitarianism, we can see the Nazi and Stalinist extermination camps as the most refined experiments in annihilating the “bare life” of *animal laborans* (although these are by no means the only instances in which the modern state has devoted itself to human slaughter). Arendt is not concerned only with the process of the extermination itself, but also the historical situation in which large-scale exterminations were made possible – above all, the emergence of ‘uprooted’ and ‘superfluous’ modern masses, what we might describe as *animal laborans* balanced on the knife-edge of ‘bare life.’ Compare her words in ‘Ideology and Terror’ (1953), which became the conclusion of later editions of The Origins of Totalitarianism: Isolation is that impasse into which men [humans] are driven when the political sphere of their lives… is destroyed… Isolated man who lost his place in the political realm of action is deserted by the world of things as well, if he is no longer recognized as homo faber but treated as an *animal laborans* whose necessary ‘metabolism with nature’ is of concern to no one. Isolation then become loneliness… Loneliness, the common ground for terror, the essence of totalitarian government, and for ideology or logicality, the preparation of its executioners and victims, is closely connected with uprootedness and superfluousness which have been the curse of modern masses since the beginning of the industrial revolution and have become acute with the rise of imperialism at the end of the last century and the break-down of political institutions and social traditions in our own time. To be uprooted means to have no place in the world, recognized and guaranteed by others; to be superfluous means not to belong to the world at all 14). The conversion of homo faber, the human being as creator of durable objects and institutions, into *animal laborans* and, later on, into homo sacer, can be traced in Arendt’s account of nineteenth century imperialism. As argued in the second volume of The Origins of Totalitarianism, European colonialism combined racism and bureaucracy to perpetrate the “most terrible massacres in recent history, the Boers’ extermination of Hottentot tribes, the wild murdering by Carl Peters in German Southeast Africa, the decimation of the peaceful Congo population – from 20 to 40 million reduced to 8 million people; and finally, perhaps worst of all, it resulted in the triumphant introduction of such means of pacification into ordinary, respectable foreign policies.” 15)  This simultaneous protection and destruction of life was also at the core of the two World Wars, as well as in many other more local conflicts, during which whole populations have become stateless or deprived of a public realm. In spite of all their political differences, the United States of Roosevelt, the Soviet Russia of Stalin, the Nazi Germany of Hitler and the Fascist Italy of Mussolini were all conceived of as states devoted to the needs of the national *animal laborans*. According to Agamben, since our contemporary politics recognizes no other value than life, Nazism and fascism, that is, regimes which have taken bare life as their supreme political criterion are bound to remain standing temptations 16).  Finally, it is obvious that this same logic of promoting and annihilating life persists both in post-industrial and in underdeveloped countries, inasmuch as economic growth depends on the increase of unemployment and on many forms of political exclusion. When politics is reduced to the tasks of administering, preserving and promoting the life and happiness of animal laborans it ceases to matter that those objectives require increasingly violent acts, both in national and international arenas. Therefore, we should not be surprised that the legality of state violence has become a secondary aspect in political discussions, since what really matters is to protect and stimulate the life of the national (or, as the case may be, Western) *animal laborans*. In order to maintain sacrosanct ideals of increased mass production and mass consumerism, developed countries ignore the finite character of natural reserves and refuse to sign International Protocols regarding natural resource conservation or pollution reduction, thereby jeopardising future humanity. They also launch preventive attacks and wars, disregard basic human rights, for instance in extra-legal detention camps such as Guantánamo,27)  and multiply refugee camps. Some countries have even imprisoned whole populations, physically isolating them from other communities, in a new form of social, political and economic apartheid. In short, states permit themselves to impose physical and structural violence against individuals and regimes (‘rogue states’ 18) ) that supposedly interfere with the security and growth of their national ‘life process.’ If, according to Arendt, the common world consists of an institutional in-between meant to outlast both human natality and mortality, in modern mass societies we find the progressive abolition of the institutional artifice that separates and protects our world from the forces of nature 19).  This explains the contemporary feeling of disorientation and unhappiness, likewise the political impossibility we find in combining stability and novelty 20).  In the context of a “waste economy, in which things must be almost as quickly devoured and discarded as they have appeared in the world, if the process itself is not to come to a sudden catastrophic end,” 21)  it is not only possible, but also necessary, that people themselves become raw material to be consumed, discarded, annihilated. In other words, when Arendt announces the “grave danger that eventually no object of the world will be safe from consumption and annihilation through consumption,” 22)  we should also remember that human annihilation, once elevated to the status of an ‘end-in-itself’ in totalitarian regimes, still continues to occur – albeit in different degrees and by different methods, in contemporary ‘holes of oblivion’ such as miserably poor Third World neighbourhoods 23)  and penitentiaries, underpaid and slave labour camps, in the name of protecting the vital interests of *animal laborans*. To talk about a process of human consumption is not to speak metaphorically but literally. Heidegger had realized this in his notes written during the late thirties, later published under the title of Overcoming Metaphysics. He claimed that the difference between war and peace had already been blurred in a society in which “metaphysical man [human], the animal rationale, gets fixed as the labouring animal,” so that “labour is now reaching the metaphysical rank of the unconditional objectification of everything present.” 24)  Heidegger argued that once the world becomes fully determined by the “circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption” it is at the brink of becoming an ‘unworld’ (Unwelt), since ‘man [human], who no longer conceals his character of being the most important raw material, is also drawn into the process. Man is “the most important raw material” because he remains the subject of all consumption.’ 25)  After the Second World War and the release of detailed information concerning the death factories Heidegger took his critique even further, acknowledging that to understand man as both subject and object of the consumption process would still not comprehend the process of deliberate mass extermination. He saw this, instead, in terms of the conversion of man into no more than an “item of the reserve fund for the fabrication of corpses” (Bestandestücke eines Bestandes der Fabrikation von Leichen). According to Heidegger, what happened in the extermination camps was that death became meaningless, and the existential importance of our anxiety in the face of death was lost; instead, people were robbed of the essential possibility of dying, so that they merely “passed away” in the process of being “inconspicuously liquidated” (unauffällig liquidiert). 26)  The human being as *animal laborans* (Arendt), as homo sacer (Agamben), as an ‘item of the reserve fund’ (Heidegger) – all describe the same process of dehumanisation whereby humankind is reduced to the bare fact of being alive, with no further qualifications. As argued by Agamben, when it becomes impossible to differentiate between biós and zóe, that is, when bare life is transformed into a qualified or specific ‘form of life,’ we face the emergence of a biopolitical epoch 27).  When states promote the animalisation of man by policies that aim at both protecting and destroying human life, we can interpret this in terms of the widespread presence of the homo sacer in our world: “If it is true that the figure proposed by our age is that of an unsacrificeable life that has nevertheless become capable of being killed to an unprecedented degree, then the bare life of homo sacer concerns us in a special way… If today there is no longer any one clear figure of the sacred man, it is perhaps because we are all virtually homines sacri.” 28) Investigating changes in the way power was conceived of and exercised at the turn of the nineteenth century, Foucault realized that when life turned out to be a constitutive political element, managed, calculated, and normalized by means of biopolitics, political strategies soon became murderous. Paradoxically, when the Sovereign’s prerogative ceased to be simply that of imposing violent death, and became a matter of promoting the growth of life, wars became more and more bloody, mass killing more frequent. Political conflicts now aimed at preserving and intensifying the life of the winners, so that enmity ceased to be political and came to be seen biologically: it is not enough to defeat the enemy; it must be exterminated as a danger to the health of the race, people or community. Thus Foucault on the formation of the modern biopolitical paradigm at the end of the nineteenth century:…death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death… now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life that endeavours to administer, optimise, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men [humans] to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars have caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end of point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population. 29)  Arendt proposed no political utopias, but she remained convinced that our political dilemmas have no necessary outcome, that history has not and will not come to a tragic end. Neither a pessimist nor an optimist, she wanted only to understand the world in which she lived in and to stimulate our thinking and acting in the present. It is always possible that radically new political constellations will come into our world, and responsibility for them will always be ours. If we wish to remain faithful to the spirit of Arendt’s political thinking, then we must think and act politically without constraining our thinking and acting in terms of some pre-defined understanding of what politics ‘is’ or ‘should’ be. In other words, I believe that the political challenge of the present is to multiply the forms, possibilities and spaces in which we can act politically. These may be strategic actions destined to further the agendas of political parties concerned with social justice. They can also be discrete, subversive actions favoured by small groups at the margins of the bureaucratised party machines, promoting political interventions free of particular strategic intentions, since their goal is to invite radical politicisation of existence. Finally, there are also actions in which ethical openness towards otherness becomes political: small and rather inconspicuous actions of acknowledging and welcoming, of extending hospitality and solidarity towards others.

### 2NC AT: FW

**3)** Representations and the affective field of images are the basis and motivation for war. What we lack is not a proper scientific or empirical challenge to violence; we lack the cultural critics willing to fight the fear mongering which results in war. The AFF’s discourse is enmeshed in a form of affective securitization that makes war inevitable. As scholars, we have an obligation to refuse and problematize the cultural grammar of security.

Elliott 2012

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In a 1991 interview for the New York Times Magazine, Don DeLillo expressed his views on the place of literature in our times in a statement that he has echoed many times since and developed most fully in his novel Mao II: In a repressive society, a writer can be deeply influential, but in a society that’s ﬁlled with glut and endless consumption, the act of terror may be the only meaningful act. People who are in power make their arrangements in secret, largely as a way of maintaining and furthering that power. People who are powerless make an open theater of violence. True terror is a language and a vision. There is a deep narrative structure to terrorist acts, and they infiltrate and alter consciousness in ways that writers used to aspire to. (qtd. in DePietro 84) The implications of DeLillo’s statement are that we are all engaged in national, international, transnational, and global conflicts in which acts of representation, including those of terrorism and spectacular physical violence as well as those of language, performance, and art compete for the attention of audiences and for influence in the public sphere. In the early days of the Iraq War, the United States used the power of images, such as those of the “mother of all bombs” and a wide array of weapons, as well as aesthetic techniques to influence and shape the consciousness of millions and to generate strong support for the war. The shock, fear, and nationalism aroused in those days after 9/11 have enabled the Bush administration to pursue a military agenda that it had planned before 9/11. Since then, the extraordinary death and destruction, scandals and illegalities, and domestic and international demonstrations and criticisms have been unable to alter the direction of this agenda. Those of us in the humanities who are trained as critical readers of political and social texts, as well as of complex artistically constructed texts, are needed now more urgently than ever to analyze the relationships between political power and the wide range of rhetorical methods being employed by politicians and others to further their destructive effects in the world. If humanities scholars can create conscious awareness of how such aesthetic devices such as we see in those photos achieve their affective appeal, citizens may begin to understand how they are being manipulated and motivated by emotion rather than by reason and logic. In spite of our ability to expose some of these verbal and visual constructions as devices of propaganda that function to enflame passions and stifle reasonable discussion, we humanities scholars find ourselves marginalized and on the defensive in our institutions of higher learning where our numbers have been diminished and where we are frequently being asked to justify the significance of our research and teaching. While we know the basic truth that the most serious threats to our societies today are more likely to result from cultural differences and failures of communication than from inadequate scientific information or technological inadequacies, we have been given no voice in this debate. With the strong tendency toward polarized thinking and opinion and the evangelical and fundamentalist religious positions in the US today and in other parts of the world, leaders continue to abandon diplomacy and resort to military actions. Most government leaders find the cultural and social explanations of the problems we face to be vague, and they are frustrated by complex human issues. That is not reason enough, however, for us to abandon our efforts to influence and perhaps even alter the current course of events. In spite of the discouragements that we as scholars of the humanities are experiencing in these times, it seems to me that we have no option but to continue to pursue our research and our teaching and hope to influence others to question the meaning and motives of what they see and hear.

5. This evidence is comparative – The role of the academic is to speak truth to power, not tell the government what they should do – they shut down critical thinking and deliberation

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(Brent, Defacing Power: The Aesthetics of Insecurity in Global Politics pg 130-132, dml) [gender/ableist language modified with brackets]

When facing these dire warnings regarding the manner in which academic-intellectuals are seduced by power, what prospects exist for parrhesia? How can academic-intellectuals speak “truth to power”? It should be noted, first, that the academic-intellectual’s **primary purpose** should not be to re-create a program to replace power or even to develop a “research program that could be employed by students of world politics,” as Robert Keohane (1989: 173) once advised the legions of the International Studies Association. Because academics are denied the “full truth” from the powerful, Foucault states, we must **avoid a trap** into which governments would want intellectuals to fall (and often they do): “**Put yourself in our place and tell us what you would do**.” This is **not a question** in which one has to answer. To make a decision on any matter requires a knowledge of the facts **refused us**, an analysis of the situation we aren’t allowed to make. There’s the trap. (2001: 453) 27 This means that any alternative order we might provide, this hypothetical “research program of our own,” will also become imbued with authority and **used for mechanisms of control**, a matter I return to in the concluding chapter of this book. When linked to a theme of counterpower, academic-intellectual parrhesia suggests, **instead**, that the academic should use his or her pulpit, their position in society, to be a “friend” “who **plays the role** of a parrhesiastes, of a truth-teller” (2001: 134). 28 When speaking of then-president Lyndon Johnson, Morgenthau gave a bit more dramatic and less amiable take that contained the same sense of urgency. What the President needs, then, is an intellectual ~~father~~-confessor, who dares to remind him[/her] of **the brittleness of power**, of its arrogance and ~~blindness~~ [ignorance], of its **limits** and **pitfalls**; who tells him[/her] how empires rise, decline and fall, how power turns to folly, empires to ashes. He[/she] ought to **listen to that voice** and **tremble**. (1970: 28) The primary purpose of the academic-intellectual is therefore not to just effect a moment of counterpower through parrhesia, let alone stimulate that heroic process whereby power realizes the error of its ways. So those who are skeptical that academics ever really, regarding the social sciences, make “that big of a difference” **are missing the point**. As we bear witness to what unfolds in front of us and collectively analyze the testimony of that which happened before us, the purpose of the academic is to “**tell the story**” of what actually happens, to document and faithfully capture both history’s events and context. “The intellectuals of America,” Morgenthau wrote, “can do only one thing: live by the standard of truth that is their peculiar responsibility as intellectuals and by which men of power will ultimately be judged as well” (1970: 28). This will take time, 29 but if this happens, if we seek to uncover and practice telling the truth free from the “**tact**,” “**rules**,” and **seduction** that constrain its telling, then, as Arendt notes, “humanly speaking, no more is required, and **no more can reasonably be asked**, for this planet to remain a place **fit for human habitation**” ([1964] 2006: 233).

### 2NC AT: BTX Defense

No link – we are a criticism of sovereign power, which is distinct – sovereign power is the power to decide between life and death, while biopower seeks to promote and protect life

Roldan, 12 – B.A. in Criminology and Sociology from the University of Illinois, Chicago (Yolanda, “Sovereign Power and Biopower – Foucault,” <http://uicsocialtheory.weebly.com/13/post/2012/12/sovereign-power-and-biopower-foucault-yolanda-roldan.html)//bghs-BI>

Foucault explains power in depth to his readers. There are five things that he says about power. He says that power is not an object, power is relational, power is productive, and power is intentional. He explains that power can be gained and one way to gain power is by having knowledge. Foucault explains that power is continual and varies. Power is always changing over time. It has matrices of transformation and power is also persuasive. Foucault also says that power operates in a way that helps it reproduce itself. In his piece titled “History of Sexuality,” he tells us about sovereign power. This is the power that gives you the right over the ability to decide between life and death. He also explains that this has turned into the power to expose someone’s life to death. For example, sovereign power could be the power that a president has to send someone to war. He also talks about direct power and indirect power. Direct power is the punishment that a sovereign power is able to enforce. The indirect power is the power that the sovereign power has to expose someone’s life to death. Basically it is the right to take life or let live. One example that I thought of when reading this was our justice system and the death or life sentence. There are some states in our government that have the death sentence. This is the sentence that one receives when they commit a crime so horrible that the judge of that case believes that the criminal deserves to be put to death. In a way, that judge holds sovereign power. He is exercising his right to take a life when he sentences someone to death. He can also exercise his power to let live by sentencing someone to life in prison instead of death. A life sentence is when someone who commits a crime bad enough gets sentenced to spend the rest of their life in prison. Another type of power that Foucault talks about is Biopower. While sovereign power was a way that people in power would take lives, biopower was the exact opposite of that. Biopower is a way that someone can exert complete and total power over someone else. The reason for doing this would be to better promote life. Foucault explains that biopower is needed to protect lives instead of taking them. This transformed the system from the right to take life or let live to the right to foster life. An example that I thought of when reading this was universal health care. Universal healthcare is when a government supplies their whole country with healthcare. With universal health care no one has to pay for health care and no one has to pay for medical services. This is, in a way, the government exercising its right to promote life. If everyone has healthcare and is being taken care of all their medical issues, and the government is paying for it then they are promoting the life of their citizens.

### 2NC AT: Perm

The only ethical position is to refuse the sovereign fiction of lines between inside and outside.

Edkins and Pin-Fat 05. Jenny Edkins, professor of international politics at Prifysgol Aberystwyth University (in Wales) and Veronique Pin-Fat, senior lecturer in politics at Manchester Universit, “Through the Wire: Relations of Power and Relations of Violence,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2005 34: pg. 14

One potential form of challenge to sovereign power consists of a refusal to draw any lines between zoe- and bios, inside and outside**.**59 As we have shown, sovereign power does not involve a power relation in Foucauldian terms. It is more appropriately considered to have become a form of governance or technique of administration through relationships of violence that reduce political subjects to mere bare or naked life. In asking for a refusal to draw lines as a possibility of challenge, then, we are not asking for the elimination of power relations and consequently, we are not asking for the erasure of the possibility of a mode of political being that is empowered and empowering, is free and that speaks: quite the opposite. Following Agamben, we are suggesting that it is only through a refusal to draw any lines at all between forms of life (and indeed, nothing less will do) that sovereign power as a form of violence can be contested and a properly political power relation (a life of power as potenza) reinstated. We could call this challenging the logic of sovereign power through refusal. Our argument is that we can evade sovereign power and reinstate a form of power relation by contesting sovereign power’s assumption of the right to draw lines, that is, by contesting the sovereign ban. Any other challenge always inevitably remains within this relationship of violence. To move outside it (and return to a power relation) we need not only to contest its right to draw lines in particular places, but also to resist the call to draw any lines of the sort sovereign power demands.¶ The grammar of sovereign power cannot be resisted by challenging or fighting over where the lines are drawn. Whilst, of course, this is a strategy that can be deployed, it is not a challenge to sovereign power per se as it still tacitly or even explicitly accepts that lines must be drawn somewhere (and preferably more inclusively). Although such strategies contest the violence of sovereign power’s drawing of a particular line, they risk replicating such violence in demanding the line be drawn differently**.** This is because such forms of challenge fail to refuse sovereign power’s line-drawing ‘ethos’, an ethos which, as Agamben points out, renders us all now homines sacri or bare life.¶ Taking Agamben’s conclusion on board, we now turn to look at how the assumption of bare life can produce forms of challenge. Agamben puts it in terms of a transformation:¶ This biopolitical body that is bare life must itself instead be transformed into the site for the constitution and installation of a form of life that is wholly exhausted in bare life and a bios that is only its own zoe-.... If we give the name form-of-life to this being that is only its own bare existence and to this life that, being its own form, remains inseparable from it we will witness the emergence of a field of research beyond the terrain defined by the intersection of politics and philosophy, medico-biological sciences and jurisprudence.60

### 2NC Alt

Refusing attempts to reform the legal system dooms it to its own nihilistic destruction—we must refuse all conceptual apparatuses of capture

Prozorov 10. Sergei Prozorov, professor of political and economic studies at the University of Helsinki, “Why Giorgio Agamben is an optimist,” Philosophy Social Criticism 2010 36: pg. 1065

In a later work, Agamben generalizes this logic and transforms it into a basic ethical imperative of his work: ‘[There] is often nothing reprehensible about the individual behavior in itself, and it can, indeed, express a liberatory intent. What is disgraceful – both politically and morally – are the apparatuses which have diverted it from their possible use. We must always wrest from the apparatuses – from all apparatuses – the possibility of use that they have captured.’32 As we shall discuss in the following section, this is to be achieved by a subtraction of ourselves from these apparatuses, which leaves them in a jammed, inoperative state. What is crucial at this point is that the apparatuses of nihilism themselves prepare their demise by emptying out all positive content of the forms-of-life they govern and increasingly running on ‘empty’, capable only of (inflict- ing) Death or (doing) Nothing.¶ On the other hand, this degradation of the apparatuses illuminates the ‘inoperosity’ (worklessness) of the human condition, whose originary status Agamben has affirmed from his earliest works onwards.33 By rendering void all historical forms-of-life, nihi- lism brings to light the absence of work that characterizes human existence, which, as irreducibly potential, logically presupposes the lack of any destiny, vocation, or task that it must be subjected to: ‘Politics is that which corresponds to the essential inoperability of humankind, to the radical being-without-work of human communities. There is pol- itics because human beings are argos-beings that cannot be defined by any proper oper- ation, that is, beings of pure potentiality that no identity or vocation can possibly exhaust.’34¶ Having been concealed for centuries by religion or ideology, this originary inoperos- ity is fully unveiled in the contemporary crisis, in which it is manifest in the inoperative character of the biopolitical apparatuses themselves, which succeed only in capturing the sheer existence of their subjects without being capable of transforming it into a positive form-of-life:¶ [T]oday, it is clear for anyone who is not in absolutely bad faith that there are no longer historical tasks that can be taken on by, or even simply assigned to, men. It was evident start- ing with the end of the First World War that the European nation-states were no longer capa- ble of taking on historical tasks and that peoples themselves were bound to disappear.35¶ Agamben’s metaphor for this condition is bankruptcy: ‘One of the few things that can be¶ declared with certainty is that all the peoples of Europe (and, perhaps, all the peoples of the Earth) have gone bankrupt’.36 Thus, the destructive nihilistic drive of the biopolitical machine and the capitalist spectacle has itself done all the work of emptying out positive forms-of-life, identities and vocations, leaving humanity in the state of destitution that Agamben famously terms ‘bare life’. Yet, this bare life, whose essence is entirely con- tained in its existence, is precisely what conditions the emergence of the subject of the coming politics:

‘this biopolitical body that is bare life must itself be transformed into the site for the constitution and installation of a form-of-life that is wholly exhausted in bare life and a bios that is only its own zoe.’37¶ The ‘happy’ form-of-life, a ‘life that cannot be segregated from its form’, is nothing but bare life that has reappropriated itself as its own form and for this reason is no longer separated between the (degraded) bios of the apparatuses and the (endangered) zoe that functions as their foundation.38 Thus, what the nihilistic self-destruction of the appara- tuses of biopolitics leaves as its residue turns out to be the entire content of a new form-of-life. Bare life, which is, as we recall, ‘nothing reprehensible’ aside from its con- finement within the apparatuses, is reappropriated as a ‘whatever singularity’, a being that is only its manner of being, its own ‘thus’.39 It is the dwelling of humanity in this irreducibly potential ‘whatever being’ that makes possible the emergence of a generic non-exclusive community without presuppositions, in which Agamben finds the possi- bility of a happy life.¶ [If] instead of continuing to search for a proper identity in the already improper and sense- less form of individuality, humans were to succeed in belonging to this impropriety as such, in making of the proper being-thus not an identity and individual property but a singularity without identity, a common and absolutely exposed singularity, then they would for the first time enter into a community without presuppositions and without subjects.40¶ Thus, rather than seek to reform the apparatuses, we should simply leave them to their self-destruction and only try to reclaim the bare life that they feed on. This is to be achieved by the practice of subtraction that we address in the following section.¶

## **1NR**

### Predictions

Linearity fails

Bernstein et al 2000 Steven Bernstein, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein and Steven Weber, University of Toronto, The Ohio State University, University of Toronto and University of California at Berkeley. “God Gave Physics the Easy Problems” European Journal of International Relations 2000; 6; 43

A deep irony is embedded in the history of the scientific study of international relations. Recent generations of scholars separated policy from theory to gain an intellectual distance from decision-making, in the belief that this would enhance the 'scientific' quality of their work. But five decades of well-funded efforts to develop theories of international relations have produced precious little in the way of useful, high confidence results. Theories abound, but few meet **the most relaxed** 'scientific' tests of validity. Even the most robust generalizations or laws we can state - war is more likely between neighboring states, weaker states are less likely to attack stronger states - **are close to trivial**, have important exceptions, and for the most part stand outside any consistent body of theory. A generation ago, we might have excused our performance on the grounds that we were a young science still in the process of defining problems, developing analytical tools and collecting data. This excuse is neither credible nor sufficient; there is no reason to suppose that another 50 years of well-funded research would result in anything resembling a valid theory in the Popperian sense. We suggest that **the nature, goals and criteria for judging social science theory should be rethought**, if theory is to be more helpful in understanding the real world. We begin by justifying our pessimism, both conceptually and empirically, and argue that the quest for *predictive* theory rests on a mistaken analogy between physical and social phenomena. Evolutionary biology is a more productive analogy for social science. We explore the value of this analogy in its 'hard' and 'soft' versions, and examine the implications of both for theory and research in international relations.2 We develop the case for forward 'tracking' of international relations on the basis of local and general knowledge as an alternative to backward-looking attempts to build deductive, nomothetic theory. We then apply this strategy to some emerging trends in international relations. This article is not a nihilistic diatribe against 'modern' conceptions of social science. Rather, it is a plea for constructive humility in the current context of attraction to deductive logic, falsifiable hypothesis and large-n statistical 'tests' of narrow propositions. We propose a practical alternative for social scientists to pursue in addition, and in a complementary fashion, to 'scientific' theory-testing. *Newtonian Physics: A Misleading Model* Physical and chemical laws make two kinds of predictions. Some phenomena - the trajectories of individual planets - can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty. Only a few variables need to be taken into account and they can be measured with precision. Other mechanical problems, like the break of balls on a pool table, while subject to deterministic laws, are inherendy unpredictable because of their complexity. Small differences in the lay of the table, the nap of the felt, the curvature of each ball and where they make contact, amplify the variance of each collision and lead to what appears as a near random distribution of balls. Most predictions in science are probabilistic, like the freezing point of liquids, the expansion rate of gases and all chemical reactions. Point predictions appear possible only because of the large numbers of units involved in interactions. In the case of nuclear decay or the expansion of gases, we are talking about *trillions* of atoms and molecules. In international relations, even more than in other domains of social science, it is often **impossible** to assign metrics to what we think are relevant variables (Coleman, 1964: especially Chapter 2). The concepts of **polarity**, relative power and the **balance of power** are among the most widely used independent variables, **but there are no commonly accepted definitions or measures** for them. Yet without consensus on definition and measurement, almost every statement or hypothesis will have too much wiggle room to be 'tested' decisively against evidence. What we take to be dependent variables fare little better. Unresolved controversies rage over the definition and evaluation of **deterrence outcomes**, and about the criteria for **democratic** **governance** and their application to specific countries at different points in their history. Differences in coding for even a few cases have significant implications for tests of theories of deterrence or of the democratic peace (Lebow and Stein, 1990; Chan, 1997). The lack of consensus about terms and their measurement is **not merely the result of** intellectual anarchy or **sloppiness** - although the latter cannot entirely be dismissed. Fundamentally, **it has more to do with the arbitrary nature of the concepts themselves.** Key terms in physics, like mass, temperature and velocity, refer to aspects of the physical universe that we cannot directly observe. However, they are embedded in theories with deductive implications that have been verified through empirical research. Propositions containing these terms are legitimate assertions about reality because their truth-value can be assessed. Social science theories are for the most part built on **'idealizations'**, that is, on concepts that cannot be anchored to observable phenomena through rules of correspondence. Most of these terms (e.g. rational actor, balance of power) are not descriptions of reality but **implicit 'theories'** about actors and **contexts that do not exist** (Hempel, 1952; Rudner, 1966; Gunnell, 1975; Moe, 1979; Searle, 1995: 68-72). The inevitable differences in interpretation of these concepts lead to different predictions in some contexts, and these outcomes may eventually produce widely varying futures (Taylor, 1985: 55). **If** problems of definition, measurement and coding could be resolved, we **would still find it** difficult, if not **impossible, to construct large enough samples** of comparable cases to permit statistical analysis. It is now almost generally accepted that in the analysis of the causes of wars, the **variation across time and the complexity of the interaction** among putative causes make the likelihood of a general theory **extraordinarily low**. Multivariate theories run into the problem of negative degrees of freedom, yet international relations rarely generates data sets in the high double digits. Where larger samples do exist, they often group together cases that differ from one another in theoretically important ways.3 Complexity in the form of multiple causation and equifinality can also make simple statistical comparisons misleading. But it is hard to elaborate more sophisticated statistical tests until one has a deeper baseline understanding of the nature of the phenomenon under investigation, as well as the categories and variables that make up candidate causes (Geddes, 1990: 131-50; Lustick, 1996: 505-18; Jervis, 1997). Wars - to continue with the same example - are similar to chemical and nuclear reactions in that they have underlying and immediate causes. **Even when all the underlying conditions are present**, these processes generally require a catalyst to begin. Chain reactions are triggered by the decay of atomic nuclei. Some of the neutrons they emit strike other nuclei prompting them to fission and emit more neutrons, which strike still more nuclei. Physicists can calculate how many kilograms of Uranium 235 or Plutonium at given pressures are necessary to produce a chain reaction. They can take it for granted that if a 'critical mass' is achieved, a chain reaction will follow. This is because trillions of atoms are present, and at any given moment enough of them will decay to provide the neutrons needed to start the reaction. In a large enough sample, catalysts will be present in a statistical sense. **Wars involve relatively few actors.** Unlike the weak force responsible for nuclear decay, their catalysts are probably **not inherent properties** of the units. Catalysts may or may not be present, and their **potentially random distribution** relative to underlying causes makes it **difficult to predict when or if an appropriate catalyst will occur**. If in the course of time underlying conditions change, reducing basic incentives for one or more parties to use force, catalysts that would have triggered war will no longer do so. This uncertain and evolving relationship between underlying and immediate causes **makes point prediction extraordinarily difficult**. **It also makes more general statements about the causation of war problematic**, since we have **no way of knowing** what wars would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts. It is probably impossible to define the universe of would-be wars or to construct a representative sample of them. Statistical inference requires knowledge about the state of independence of cases, but in a practical sense that knowledge is often **impossible to obtain in the analysis of international relations**.

### Util

#### Utilitarian calculability justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end

Weizman 11 (Eyal Weizman, professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10)

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book *The Lesser Evil*, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay *The Order of Evils*. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.17

### Barder

Expanding neolib is the internal link to all impact scenarios

Nhanenge 7 (Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT)

There is today an increasing critique of economic development, whether it takes place in the North or in the South. Although the world on average generates more and more wealth, the riches do not appear to "trickle down" to the poor and improve their material well-being. Instead, poverty and economic inequality is growing. Despite the existence of development aid for more than half a century, the Third World seems not to be "catching up" with the First World. Instead, militarism, dictatorship and human repression is multiplied. Since the mid 1970, the critique of global economic activities has intensified due to the escalating deterioration of the natural environment. Modernization, industrialisation and its economic activities have been directly linked to increased scarcity of natural resources and generation of pollution, which increases global temperatures and degrades soils, lands, water, forests and air. The latter threat is of great significance, because without a healthy environment human beings and animals will not be able to survive. Most people believed that modernization of the world would improve material well-being for all. However, faced with its negative side effects and the real threat of extinction, one must conclude that somewhere along the way "progress" went astray. Instead of material plenty, economic development generated a violent, unhealthy and unequal world. It is a world where a small minority live in material luxury, while millions of people live in misery. These poor people are marginalized by the global economic system. They are forced to survive from degraded environments; they live without personal or social security; they live in abject poverty, with hunger, malnutrition and sickness; and they have no possibility to speak up for themselves and demand a fair share of the world's resources. The majority of these people are women, children, traditional peoples, tribal peoples, people of colour and materially poor people (called women and Others). They are, together with nature, dominated by the global system of economic development imposed by the North. It is this scenario, which is the subject of the dissertation. The overall aim is consequently to discuss the unjustified domination of women, Others and nature and to show how the domination of women and Others is interconnected with the domination of nature. A good place to start a discussion about domination of women, Others and nature is to disclose how they disproportionately must carry the negative effects from global economic development. The below discussion is therefore meant to give an idea of the "flip-side" of modernisation. It gives a gloomy picture of what "progress" and its focus on economic growth has meant for women, poor people and the natural environment. The various complex and inter-connected, negative impacts have been ordered into four crises. The categorization is inspired by Paul Ekins and his 1992 book "A new world order; grassroots movements for global change". In it, Ekins argues that humanity is faced with four interlocked crises of unprecedented magnitude. These crises have the potential to destroy whole ecosystems and to extinct the human race. The first crisis is the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, together with the high level of military spending. The second crisis is the increasing number of people afflicted with hunger and poverty. The third crisis is the environmental degradation. Pollution, destruction of ecosystems and extinction of species are increasing at such a rate that the biosphere is under threat. The fourth crisis is repression and denial of fundamental human rights by governments, which prevents people from developing their potential. It is highly likely that one may add more crises to these four, or categorize them differently, however, Ekins's division is suitable for the present purpose. (Ekins 1992: 1).